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FOOD SAFETY CRISES AS CRISES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Elizabeth Fishert
The history of food safety regulation has been a history of food
safety crises and regulatory responses to those crises.' As that is the
case, most literature concerned with what can be learned from a food
safety crises focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of regulatory
regimes.2 This is because central to any crisis is the role of regulation
in identifying, assessing, and managing risks.
Historically, regulators have primarily prevented the deliberate
and grossly negligent contamination of food.4 Increasingly, in the last
forty years, food safety crises have involved more uncertain and com-
plex health risks, risks that are socio-politically contentious and re-
quire considerable scientific resources for their assessment. In such
circumstances, the creation and operation of food safety regulation has
largely been conceptualised as requiring a choice between whether the
scientific and democratic inputs into decision-making should domi-
Reader in Environmental Law, Corpus Christi College and Faculty of
Law, University of Oxford.
1 See generally MICHAEL FRENCH & JIM PHILLIPS, CHEATED NOT
POISONED?: FOOD REGULATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1875-1938 (2000); see also
Government White Paper on the Food Standards Agency, The Food Standards Agen-
cy: A Force for Change, Cm. 3830 (Jan. 14, 1998); CHRISTOPHER ANSELL & DAVID
VOGEL, WHAT'S THE BEEF?: THE CONTESTED GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN FOOD
SAFETY (2006).
2 See generally INGEBORG PAULUS, THE SEARCH FOR PURE FOOD: A
SOCIOLOGY OF LEGISLATION IN BRITAIN (1974); JOHN HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD:
SECURING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF 1906 (1989).
3 See MARIA LEE, EU REGULATIONS OF GMOs: LAW AND DECISION MAKING
FOR A NEW TECHNOLOGY (Han Somsen ed., 2008); PATRICK VAN ZWANENBERG &
ERIK MILLSTONE, BSE: RISK, SCIENCE AND GOVERNANCE (2005).
4 CLAYTON A. COPPIN & JACK HIGH, THE POLITICS OF PURITY: HARVEY
WASHINGTON WILEY AND THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL FOOD POLICY (1999); see FRENCH
& PHILLIPS, supra note 1, at 191-92.
5 Peter Barton Hutt, Recent Developments: The State ofScience at the Food
and Drug Administration, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 431 (2008).
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nate. Any particular crisis is understood as an example, for that
commentator at least, of the wrong input dominating.
In this article, I argue not only that this is an incorrect characteri-
sation of food safety crises and food safety regulation, but also that
this characterisation creates a massive "blindspot"7 which results in
decision-makers and scholars failing to learn as much as they can, and
should, from any particular controversy. In particular, the characteri-
sation of food safety decision-making in such binary terms results in a
failure to see that food safety decision-making is administrative in
nature. Moreover, food safety crises are essentially controversies over
what constitutes legitimate administrative decision-making. Crises
are controversies over how to constitute, limit, and hold public admin-
istration to account so as to ensure that any regulatory decision is
reasonable. In essence, these are debates over "administrative consti-
tutionalism" in that they are normative debates over the different roles
that law can, and should, play in constituting and limiting public ad-
ministration. By understanding a food safety crisis in these terms
there is far more that scholars and law makers can learn about the
nature of the crisis and the possible responses to it.
This article illustrates the value of viewing food safety controver-
sies through the lens of administrative constitutionalism with two case
studies. The first examines the litigation concerning whether the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had the power
under the Food and Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to regulate to-
bacco.9 The second case study examines why the United
Kingdom (UK) government relied on a short and guarded report of an
ad hoc committee, the Southwood Working Party, in asserting that
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) posed no risks to human
health.i0 That decision, and all other aspects of what has become
6 See Les Levidow, Precautionary Uncertainty: Regulating GM Crops in
Europe, 31 Soc. STUD. SCI. 842 (2001); FOOD SAFETY REGULATION IN EUROPE: A
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Ellen Vos & Frank Wendler eds., 2006).
7 For a discussion about blindspots, see Elizabeth Fisher & Patrick Schmidt,
Seeing the Blindspots in Administrative Law: Theory, Practice, and Rulemaking
Settlements in the United States, 30 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 272 (2001); Jim Rossi,
Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rule-
making Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015 (2001).
8 ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM 22-26 (2007).
9 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C 1997);
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998).
10 DEP'T OF HEALTH, MINISTRY OF AGRIC., FISHERIES & FOOD, REPORT OF THE
WORKING PARTY ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY 21 (1989) [hereinafter
WORKING PARTY REPORT ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY].
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known as the 'BSE crisis' was the subject of a three year independent
inquiry set up by the incoming Labour government in 1997." The
Inquiry is known as the BSE Inquiry and was chaired by a member of
the judiciary, Lord Justice Phillips. This article draws on the oral and
written evidence submitted at that Inquiry.
These controversies are very different, as are the legal cultures in
which they operate, but both highlight the importance of administra-
tive constitutionalism for framing and directing food safety crises.
Moreover, these case studies highlight how administrative constitutio-
nalism opens up a series of important lines of inquiry for scholars and
policy-makers thinking about food safety crises.
This article is divided into three parts. In Part One, I first examine
how scholars and decision-makers have understood food safety crises
in terms of requiring a choice between whether science or politics
should dominate food safety decision-making and the limits of this
way of characterising these controversies. I then examine the concept
of administrative constitutionalism and introduce the two paradigms
of administrative constitutionalism which have dominated food safety
regulation - the rational instrumental paradigm and the deliberative-
constitutive paradigm. In Part Two, I present the two case studies
described above. Both examine very different aspects of food and
drug safety issues, but both highlight the power of administrative con-
stitutionalism as an explanatory lens. In Part Three, I conclude by
considering the implications for scholars and decision-makers of
thinking about food safety issues in terms of administrative constitu-
tionalism.
Two points should be made before starting. First, it should be
noted that the arguments about administrative constitutionalism pre-
sented in this article are made at greater length in a recent book which
also considers an analysis of administrative constitutionalism in U.S.
environmental and occupational health and safety law.'2 Second, the
human health risks from food that this article focuses on are primarily
technological risks. That is, they are risks that arise, often inadver-
tently, from human activity. Technological risks are notable for being
scientifically uncertain, complex, and often the focus of socio-political
" The BSE Inquiry, The Inquiry into BSE and Variant CJD in the United
Kingdom (2000), available at http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/
archive/20060308232515/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/index.html (last visited Mar.
18, 2010).
12 See generally FISHER, supra note 8.
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debate.' 3 The food and drug safety risks discussed in this article are
no exception.14
I. MAKING SENSE OF A FOOD SAFETY CRISIS
The theme of crisis and controversy pervades food safety regula-
tion." My concern in this article is not the question of whether a cri-
sis exists or whether controversy is valid - in nearly all cases where
the language of crisis and controversy is used, a regulatory regime is
understood to have failed and thus in need of reform.16 Rather, my
concern, and this article's focus, is why a regime is understood to
have failed and what form the reform should take. My argument is
that the predominant way in which food safety crises have been con-
ceptualised has created a "blindspot" which severely limits the capaci-
ty of scholars, decision-makers, and policy-makers to learn from a
food safety crisis.
A. How Not to Think About a Food Safety Crisis: The
Science/Democracy Binary Choice
The predominant orthodoxy in scholarship and policy is to under-
stand the development of frameworks for food safety and other forms
of risk regulation decision-making and food safety decision-making as
requiring a choice between grounding decisions on primarily a
democratic or a scientific basis.17 Thus food safety decisions are un-
derstood as requiring a binary choice between allowing one of these
13 Id. at 7-11.
14 ROBERT RABIN & STEPHEN SUGARMAN (EDS), REGULATING TOBACCO
(2001); Sheila Jasanoff, Civilization and Madness: The Great BSE Scare of 1996, in
PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE 221 (1997).
15 This is most obvious in the UK and EU context. See Roman Gerodimos,
The UK BSE Crisis as a Failure of Government, 84 PUB. ADMIN. 911 (2004); THE
MAD Cow CRISIS: HEALTH AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (Scott C. Ratzan ed., 1998); Gian-
domenico Majone, The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation, 38 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 273, 274, 281-83 (2000); RICHARD LACEY, UNFIT FOR HUMAN
CONSUMPTION: FOOD IN CRISIS - CONSEQUENCES OF PUTING PROFIT BEFORE SAFETY
(1992).
16 See ANSELL & VOGEL, supra note 1.
17 See LEE, supra note 3, at 72-89; Mikhail Kritikos, Traditional Risk Analy-
sis and Releases of GMOs into the European Union: Space for Non-Scientific Fac-
tors? 34 EUR. L. REV. 405 (2009); James T. O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA's
Second Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 939 (2008); ORTWiN RENN, RISK GOVERNANCE: COPING WITH
UNCERTAINTY IN A COMPLEX WORLD (2008); Erik Millstone, Can Food Safety Policy-
Making Be Both Scientifically and Democratically Legitimated? If So, How?, 20 J.
AGRIC. ENVTL. ETHICS 483, 497 (2007).
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inputs to dominate. There are many different versions of this choice.
And it can be characterised as a choice between: participatory
discourse and expert opinion; interest group politics and scientific
objectivity; irrational fear and scientific analysis. In each of these
circumstances, the non-dominating factor still has a role to play but it
is only marginal.18
Furthermore, food safety crises are primarily understood by com-
mentators as resulting from decision-makers and legislators getting
the choice wrong. Thus poor decisions are understood as a product of
favouring the wrong type of input into decision-making.' 9 However,
different commentators have different views over whether scientific or
democratic inputs should dominate. 20
Besides the vagueness and malleability inherent in the concepts of
science and democracy, three main problems plague this understand-
ing of food safety crises. The first problem is that this characterisa-
tion of food safety controversies suggests that disputes over food safe-
ty are fundamentally conflicts between facts on one side and values on
the other. But opponents in food safety crises usually simultaneously
disagree about the relevant science and the relevant values. 2 1 The
second problem with this characterisation is that science and democ-
racy are treated as different realms of public life, but there is little
discussion of the institutional contexts in which they operate and of
how those contexts might shape understandings of scientific or
democratic inputs. In particular, the focus on science and democracy
overlooks the fact that food safety decision-making is primarily the
province of the unelected administrative decision-makers and thus can
never be truly scientific or truly democratic. 2 2 Food safety decision-
making cannot be democratic due to the fact that food decision-
makers are not elected and cannot be subject to direct rule. Likewise,
they cannot be truly scientific because their decisions are not only
18 FISHER, supra note 8, at I 1-14.
9 See LEE, supra note 3, at 72-89; Jacqueline Peel, Risk Regulation Under
the WTO SPS Agreement: Science as an International Normative Yardstick? 7 (Jean
Monnet Program, Working Paper No. 02/04, 2004), available at http://www
.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040 201.pdf, Hutt, supra note 5.
20 ERIK MILLSTONE ET AL., SCIENCE IN TRADE DISPUTE RELATED TO
POTENTIAL RISKS: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES (2004), available at http://epub.oeaw
.ac.at/0xclaa500d_0x0010b251.pdf.
21 See generally Flue-Cured Tobacco Co-op v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435
(M.D.N.C. 1998); Panel Report, E C Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997); Director of Animal and Plant Qua-
rantine v. Australian Pork Ltd. (2005) 206 F.C.R 1; see also Case T-13/99, Pfizer
Animal Health SA v. Council of the European Union, 2002 E.C.R. 11-3305.
22 See FISHER, supra note 8, at 16-18.
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based on science but also policy, law, and other factors. Moreover,
the administrative context directs, frames, and limits action. The third
problem is that the present depiction of food safety crises and contro-
versies tends to sideline the role of legal discourse. Law is understood
to be an instrument to promote either a more scientific or democratic
approach.23 However, food safety is a fiendishly complex area of law,
and food safety crises often have a significant legal dimension and
frequently results in legal reform.24
The sketch above may seem to some as too unsophisticated and
unfair a depiction of present commentary about food safety. Yet my
point is that the invidious nature of this dichotomy has blinded com-
mentators to the realities of food safety decision making. Controver-
sies are oversimplified and understood to be solely a product of crude
politics where either more science or more participation is proposed as
the perfect answer. The administrative nature of food safety decision-
making is overlooked, as is the importance of law to food safety regu-
lation.
B. How to Think About a Food Safety Crisis: Administrative
Constitutionalism
Saying all this is not to say that there is not a role for politics,
participation, values, science, and information in food safety decision-
making. All these elements are incorporated into food safety decision-
making, although, as we shall see, they can be defined and
incorporated in fundamentally different ways. My argument is that
far more analysis must be done on the context in which that decision-
making occurs, and that context is administrative. By focusing on this
context, a more subtle and nuanced picture can be gained of what
disputes in food safety are really about.
The significance of the administrative context is that, in a liberal
democracy, public administration suffers from a legitimacy deficit
because of unelected and unelectable nature of public administra-
23 For a discussion of the instrumental understanding of law in the legislative
context see John Applegate, A Beginning Not an End In Itself The Role of Risk As-
sessment in Environmental Decision Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1643 (1995). For a
more general discussion, see Jeremy Fraiberg & Michael Trebilock, Risk Regulation:
Technocratic or Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform, 43 McGILL L.J. 835
(1998).
24 See generally Ralph F. Fuchs, The Formulation and Review ofRegulations
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1939); R.
HAMILTON, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TEX.
L. REv. 1132 (1972); PETER B. HuTr & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (2nd ed. 1991).
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tion.25  That legitimacy deficit is particularly acute in the public
administration of food safety because the uncertain and highly tech-
nical nature of food safety issues makes decision-making particularly
opaque.26 In these circumstances, divergent groups of legal and poli-
cy actors have fundamentally divergent understandings about what is,
and what should be, the role and nature of public administration. This
conflict is best described as a conflict over "administrative constitu-
tionalism" in that disagreement arises over what form public adminis-
tration should take so as to ensure principled and constitutional
government. Those disagreements have both descriptive and norma-
tive aspects in that they are disagreements over how to conceptualise
what public administration actually is doing, and what it should do.
There are three particularly important features of administrative
constitutionalism to appreciate. First, administrative constitutionalism
is an "essentially contested" 27 concept and there will nearly always be
debate over the nature and role of public administration just as there is
always debate over concepts such as the rule of law and democracy. 2 8
Second, and most significantly for lawyers, administrative
constitutionalism is part of legal culture because debate and discourse
invariably concerns the role of law in constituting, limiting and
holding public administration accountable. 29 Third, debates over ad-
ministrative constitutionalism are most likely to take place as part of
the process of holding a decision maker to account.30 Those processes
include legal processes sudh as judicial review and more political
processes such as official inquiries. Most significantly, a focus on
administrative constitutionalism highlights that the process of holding
a decision maker to account is the process of challenging what is legi-
timate public administration. Thus a litigant seeking judicial review is
25 BRIAN COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF GOVERNMENT: RECONSIDERING THE
ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 3 (1996); see FISHER,
supra note 8, at 16-18.
26 Cf HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING
ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY 3 (2002).27 W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN
Soc'Y 167, 168 (1956).
28 See FISHER, supra note 8, at 22-26.
29 For a lengthy discussion of the concept of legal culture, see id. at 35-39.
For a discussion on studies that map the difference between legal cultures, see gener-
ally David Nelken, Disclosing/Invoking Legal Culture: An Introduction, 4 Soc. &
LEGAL STUD. 435 (1995) (highlighting several different ways of conceptualizing legal
culture and discussing the inherent conceptual difficulties involved).
30 See FISHER, supra note 8, at 24-25.
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often arguing that a decision maker misunderstood their role and the
proper basis for decision-making.3 1
Despite significant variations between legal cultures there are also
enduring normative understandings about the role of public adminis-
tration. Broadly speaking, in the context of food safety decision-
making, two different paradigms of administrative constitutionalism
have dominated thinking - the rational-instrumental (RI) and the
deliberative constitutive (DC). 32 According to the RI paradigm of
administrative constitutionalism, public administration is a Weberian
bureaucracy,33 a "transmission belt"34 that applies facts to specific
legislative commands. Facts include information rigorously policed
by scientific and social scientific methodologies and preferences
voiced through a fair pluralist participatory process.35 Reasonable RI
administrative action carries out this process of application in the most
36
efficient and effective manner possible. RI administration is
understood as legitimate because the food safety problems that RI
administration deals with are understood to be inherently manageable
by analytical techniques and rigorous participatory processes.37
In contrast, DC public administration is understood as a substan-
tive institution engaging in ongoing problem solving through the
exercise of flexible discretion based on deliberation and analysis.
Analysis is understood to be a flexible tool that must be adapted to
different problems. 39 Deliberation is understood to be a transforma-
tive process that is more than just a trade off between different value
3' For a study of this phenomena in U.S. administrative law, see id. at 89-
124. 32 For a far more detailed account of these two paradigms, see id. at 26-35.
These paradigms are also reflected in earlier administrative law works. MARTIN
SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION
(1988); COOK, supra note 25, at 5-6; THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING
RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
5-16 (1991); CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
(3rd ed. 2009).
33 FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills
eds. and trans., Routledge 1991) (1948).
34 Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1684 (1975).
35 See FISHER, supra note 8, at 28-30.
36 Id. at 29.
37 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2002).
3 See FISHER, supra note 8, at 30-32; see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1511 (1992).
39 See FISHER, supra note 8, at 30-31.
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preferences. 4 0  The legitimacy of DC administration is derived from
its substantive role in addressing complex problems in the democratic
public interest.
These two different paradigms are represented in the table below:
Table One: The Rational Instrumental and Deliberative-
Constitutive Paradigms of Administrative Constitutionalism
Rationsl-Instrumental Deliberative-Constitutive
Food Safety Problems
Nature of Objective and quantifiable Complex socio-political disputes
Problems Scientific uncertainty as manageable involving values and epistemological
problems
Nature of Value laden aspects limited to those Values inherent in all aspects of
Regulatory identified in legislation. Scientific decisionmaking and scientific
Decision-Making analysis constrained by analysis adapted to the problem at
methodological frameworks. hand. Participation through
Participation through interest deliberation.
representation.
Public Administration and Law
i Relationship with Principal/Agent Constitutive ongoing authority
Primary Law granted by primary lawmaker
Maker
Limits on Legislation Constitutive structure
Discretion Analytical methodology Deliberative process
Interest representation
Accountability Policing the methodology of Requires those reviewing the
decision-making and ensuring that decisions to engage in a substantive
decision makers have kept within review of decision-making
legislative limits.
As can be seen from the table, each paradigm of administrative
constitutionalism prescribes a very different role not only for public
administration but also for the law in constituting, limiting, and hold-
ing public administration to account. Moreover, each paradigm also
conceptualises the nature of food safety problems differently.41  For
40 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four
Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271 (1986); Robert B. Reich, Public Administra-
tion and Public Deliberation: An Interpretative Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617 (1985).
41 See generally David Winickoff et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars:
Science, Risk and Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 81, 94 (2005);
Brian Wynne, Seasick on the Third Wave? Subverting the Hegemony of Propositio-
nalism: Response to Collins & Evans (2002), 33 Soc. STUD. Sci. 401 (2003); SHELIA
JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND THE
the RI paradigm to be logical, food safety issues are understood to be
manageable. In contrast, under the DC paradigm, the wide-ranging
discretion of public administrators is justified on the basis of the com-
plexity and uncertainty that pervades food safety issues.42 Likewise,
both the RI and DC paradigms mobilise science and participation but
define and utilise them in different ways. Science under the RI
paradigm is largely defined in terms of methodologies which can be
strictly applied.43 In contrast, science under the DC paradigm has a
broader definition which also encapsulates scientific judgment and
expertise." Likewise, participation under the RI paradigm is a bar-
gaining process whereby public administrators play an "umpire
role."A5 In contrast, under the DC paradigm, participation is delibera-
tive in nature and requires public administration to take a more signif-
icant leadership role.46
Neither paradigm offers up a perfect model of public administra-
tion in the food safety context. The RI paradigm addresses the prob-
lem of the legitimacy of public administration by ensuring that it is
limited and controlled and has no authority except that derived from
the legislature. In that sense, it is the classic model for lawyers.
Likewise, it offers a means of assessing the success of a risk regula-
tion regime by seeing whether certain legislative commands were
followed through,47 particularly if food safety issues are understood in
quantitative terms. Yet at the same time, the RI model does not ade-
quately address the complex nature of technological risk.48 The focus
in the RI paradigm on control of public administration means that the
actual addressing of the problems administration was set up to address
is overlooked. Indeed, RI public administration is often seen as the
UNITED STATES 23-26 (2005).
42 See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK:
INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1996).
43 The strict application of methodologies is discussed in CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 129-48 (2005); Elizabeth
Fisher, Risk and Environmental Law: A Beginner's Guide, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
FOR SUSTAINABILITY 97, 101-08 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood eds.,
2006).
44 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION (1993).
45 See Stewart, supra note 34, at 1711, 1722, 1760, 1790.
46 See generally Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democrat-
ic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. (1998); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 42.
47 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
REGULATORY PROTECTION 27-31 (2002).
48 See Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 13-
15 (1998).
64 HEAL TH MA TRIX [Vol. 20:55
FOOD SAFETY CRISES
cause of many technological risk controversies for exactly this rea-
son.49
In contrast, the DC paradigm starts with the messiness of technol-
ogical risk problems and acknowledges that those problems require a
flexible institutional response. As such, public administration is rec-
ognised as a permanent feature of the democratic landscape and is
given wide discretion. While such an institutional structure may pro-
vide an appropriate framework for decision-making, it also threatens
to usurp the legislature. Thus, for lawyers, it is a more difficult model
to conceptualise and accept, even though, as shall be shown,
numerous regimes have been built on the DC paradigm. Public admin-
istration has its own internal authority, but it is difficult to provide a
justification for it other than necessity. Likewise, the process of hold-
ing a decision maker to account is not an easy one. If a decision is
said to be the product of complex deliberation and the judgment of the
public administration, then it is difficult to know when a decision
maker got it right and when a decision maker got it wrong.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
ACTION: TWO EXAMPLES
The discussion so far has been frustratingly abstract. In this
second part, I illustrate the power of the lens of administrative consti-
tutionalism by considering two recent controversies in terms of the RI
and DC paradigms. The first example involves a series of cases deal-
ing with the issue of whether the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) had the power to regulate tobacco under the Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act.50 The second example concerns why the UK govern-
ment relied heavily on a single report of an ad hoc Working Party in
asserting there was no human health risk from BSE.5'
At first blush, the selection of these two case studies to sit side by
side may appear very odd. Yet, as Gerhard Danneman has noted,
"there is no point in comparing what is identical, and little point in
comparing what has nothing in common. 52 These two examples are
49 ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter
trans., 1992); see also Brian Wynne, Uncertainty and Environmental Learning:
Reconceiving Science and Policy in the Preventive Paradigm, 2 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 111 (1992).
50 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. U.S. Food FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C
1997); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998).
51 For a lengthier analysis, see FISHER, supra note 8, at 59-88.
52 Gerhard Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differ-
ences?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 384 (Mathias Reimann &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
2010] 65
HEALTH MA TRIX
clearly not identical. The first involves an isolated doctrinal point
about statutory interpretation, and the second concerns the institution-
al role of expert advice in UK public administration. Moreover, both
case studies reflect the very different legal cultures operating in the
United States and United Kingdom, which have resulted in two very
different discourses about administrative constitutionalism.1 In the
United States, administrative constitutionalism has been a discourse
carried out primarily in judicial and legislative terms. This is particu-
larly true in the judicial arena because of the way in which "adversari-
al legalism" is an inherent feature of U.S. legal culture.54 In the
United Kingdom, administrative constitutionalism is a blurring of law,
policy, political theory, ideology, and convention.55 Moreover, it is a
product of a "language of normative discussion, the set of historical
reference points, the range of solutions proposed in the past, the insti-
tutional norms taken for granted, given a particular context of
repeated social interaction."5 6 Indeed, UK administrative law is pro-
foundly pluralistic in its legal forms. 7
Nevertheless, these examples do have something in common in
that they are both examples of highly politicised controversies that
have been largely understood in terms of requiring decisions to be
either based on science or democracy. In particular, both controver-
sies have largely been understood as examples of crude interest group
politics - an explanation which provides very little in the way of
constructive reform beyond injecting more "objectivity" or greater
"genuine participation" in the process. By viewing these two disputes
through the lens of administrative constitutionalism, a very different
set of issues are highlighted - a set of issues intimately tied to ques-
tions about the legitimacy of public administration and the role of law.
A. Defining Tobacco in the FDA
The litigation concerning whether the FDA could regulate tobacco
under the FDCA did not deal directly with a food safety crisis. Ra-
ther, it concerned one of the most significant controversies in which
the FDA was involved (in recent decades). This controversy is
53 For a more in-depth discussion of this point, see FISHER, supra note 8.
54 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW (2001).
5 HARLOW & RAWLINGS, supra note 32.
56 Jeremy Webber, Culture, Legal Culture, and Legal Reasoning: A Com-
ment on Nelken, 29 AuSTL. J. LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 27, 32 (2004).
5 See H. W. Arthurs, Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Busi-
ness, 17 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (1979); HARLOW & RAWLINGS, supra note 32.
58 See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE
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usually understood as the product of politics5 9 - an explanation which
completely sidelines the fact that the case was really about the nature
of the FDA. In particular, it overlooks the fact that while there was
little disagreement over the relevant legal precedents or principles of
statutory interpretation in the case,o the way in which those legal
principles were understood to limit the FDA were conceptualised very
differently. Indeed, as the majority in the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit noted, "at its core, this case is about who has the power
to make this type of major policy decision."6 1 In particular, it was
about whether the FDA should be understood in RI or DC terms.
In 1996, the FDA passed a regulation that restricted the sale and
distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to children and ado-
lescents.62 Tobacco was not mentioned in the FDCA, so whether the
FDA had the legislative authority largely depended on whether, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, tobacco products fell within one of
the classes of products that the FDA possessed the authority to regu-
late. The FDCA states that the FDA can regulate "combination prod-
ucts," which are defined as products that "constitute a combination of
a drug, device, or biologic product."63 A "drug" is defined under that
Act as "articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or the
function of the body."64 The FDA's authority thus rested not on the
existence of a serious health hazard but rather on the "objective in-
tent" of the manufacturers.6 5 In light of new evidence about the addic-
tive effects of nicotine and of tobacco manufacturers' manipulation of
tar and nicotine levels in cigarettes, the FDA felt that it could establish
WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY 51, 83, 266-67 (2001); M. Gillhooley, Tobacco Unregu-
lated: Why the FDA Failed and What To Do Now, 111 YALE L. J. 1179 (2002).
59 Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian Democ-
racy, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 433 (2000); ALLAN BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY 242
(2007).
6 The relevant legal authority setting forth the principles for judicial review
of an agency's construction of the statute which it administers is Chevron, U.S.A. Inc.,
v. Nat'I Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
61 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 176 (4th Cir.
1998).
62 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (Aug.
28, 1996). The regulation later was repealed in 2000, following the Supreme Court
decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), which
held that Congress had not given FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products as
customarily marketed.
63 21 U.S.C.A. § 353(g)(1) (West 2006).
6 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(g)(1)(C) (West 2006).
65 See FDA Commissioner's arguments in Action on Smoking & Health v.
Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 238-39 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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that nicotine "affected the structure and function of the body" and that
manufacturers intended for that to occur.66 The FDCA required the
FDA to provide "reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness
of the device"67 once regulated, and while this would suggest the need
to ban cigarettes, the FDA felt that this was not acceptable as it would
lead to a black market.68 In light of the fact that eighty percent of
people started smoking at, or before, the age of sixteen,69 a regulation
banning sale of tobacco cigarettes to minors would provide a far more
"reasonable assurance." Thus from a purely textual perspective, it
could be argued that the FDA could be found to have authority over
tobacco products.70
Yet the series of judgments in these cases were not concerned
with the purely literal perspective. The courts in reviewing these cas-
es were bound by administrative law doctrine, and in particular, the
two-step test for statutory interpretation set out in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Under the first step,
if the "intent of Congress" was clear, both the court and an adminis-
trative body should abide by that intent. If the intent was ambiguous,
then the agency's interpretation should stand unless it was unreasona-
ble.72 Yet while the Chevron test has become the "ubiquitous formula
governing court-agency relations" 73 and has been applied in thousands
of cases, 74 it can be applied in a number of different ways.75 As a
result, the Chevron test provides very little directive guidance.
66 Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco is a Drug and These Prod-
ucts are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act:
Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619 (Aug. 28, 1996).
67 E.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i) (West 2006).
68 As discussed in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 139 (2000).
Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco A Drug? Administrative Agencies as Com-
mon Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1021 (1998); see 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26(a)(1)
(2008). It is also interesting to note that the Synar Amendment (passed in 1992)
makes it a precondition of Federal grants to States that those states ban the sale of
tobacco products to minors and as such the rule already exists in all states.
70 Sunstein, supra note 69, at 1017.
7' 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
72 Id. at 842-44.
n Thomas Merrill & Kristin Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
834 (2001); see Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power
in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989); see also Mark
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decision Making in Re-
viewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994) (applying deli-
berative democracy to modify the Chevron test for interpreting statutes).
74 E.g., Peter Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empir-
ical Study ofFederal Administrative Law, 39 DUKE L.J. 984,989 n. 13 (1990).
7 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doc-
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Instead, whether a judge found that the FDA had jurisdiction
largely depended on his or her understanding about the FDA's role
and the nature of its relationship to Congress. Most judges in these
cases started with those understandings, which subsequently dictated
the outcomes. In particular, in line with step one of the Chevron test,
the point of departure was what Congress was assumed to have dele-
gated to the FDA. If that delegation was construed in RI terms as
limited to a set of specific tasks, then the FDA could not act on its
own initiative to regulate tobacco because that would be exercising
power it did not have. If, however, it was understood that the FDA
had been entrusted with DC powers to address the general problem of
food and drug safety, then the FDA's assertion of authority jurisdic-
tion over tobacco products was lawful. In other words, the issue of
the FDA's power was not simply ideological but was directly con-
cerned with the ways in which law and legal culture had constructed
the FDA's power.
That exercise of construction of the FDA's power did not occur in
a vacuum. The answer to the question of what is and should be the
FDA's role should ideally be derived from a history of the FDA and
FDCA and from broader administrative law principles. Yet, as with
all risk regulation, those principles and that history did not present a
definitive answer. As already seen, the Chevron doctrine was ambi-
guous, and the FDCA and the FDA had developed in a piecemeal
fashion mainly in response to a variety of crises and developments in
administrative law.76 On the one hand, the original logic behind the
FDCA was a very limited RI one, concerned with a specific task - the
proper labelling of foods.77 Later amendments, such as the Delaney
clause, were also consistent with the RI paradigm, in that they gave
very little discretion to the FDA.79 However, these amendments were
interspersed with other legislative and administrative reforms that
granted greater rulemaking discretion to the FDA. The most dramatic
metamorphosis occurred as part of the second wave of New Deal leg-
trine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 366-69 (1994); see also Michael P. Healy, Textualism's
Limits on the Administrative State: Of Isolated Waters, Barking Dogs, and Chevron,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,928 (2001).
76 For a history see generally YOUNG, supra note 2; David F. Cavers, The
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive
Contents, 6 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 2 (1939); see also CHARLES 0. JACKSON,
FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE NEw DEAL (1970).
7 See United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 496-98 (1911).
78 The Delaney Clause stated "that no additive shall be deemed to be safe
if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal." 21 U.S.C.
§ 348(c)(3)(A) (West 2006).
9 Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
692010]
islation with the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938.80 The FDA
was thus a body whose purpose and nature had evolved with new
Presidents, new Commissioners, and with legislative amendments.8 '
The judges, in these cases in ruling on the matter of agency au-
thority, were required to make a decision about the appropriate model
of administrative constitutionalism in this shifting context. Judge
Osteen in the District Court embraced a DC approach. He noted that
the intentionally broad definition of "drug," along with other amend-
ments, was intended to "amplify and strengthen the FDCA so as to
ensure that the consumer was protected against 'a multiplicity of
abuses not subject to the present law."' 82 Likewise, Judge Osteen
drew attention to the expertise and discretion of the FDA. As such,
the issue was whether it was obvious that Congress had not intended
the FDA to regulate tobacco, and held there was no such intent (ex-
cept in regard to the provisions that limited advertising and promo-
tion);84 therefore, the FDA did have authority.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision, stating that Judge Osteen had proceeded on a "fun-
damental misconception" that "unavoidably skewed the remainder of
[his] analysis."8 This sharp disagreement was due to the fact that the
RI paradigm underpinning the majority's approach and the majority's
choice to construe the FDA as a "servant" of Congress. The real
question, the majority argued was "whether Congress intended to del-
egate such jurisdiction to the FDA or, in other words, whether the
FDA had explicit authorisation.86 Thus they stated that "[w]e begin
with the basic proposition that agency power is not the power to make
law. Rather it is the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the
will of Congress as expressed by the statute." 7 This was indeed a
fundamentally different question than that posed by the district court.
On the majority's analysis, Congress had not explicitly authorised the
FDA to regulate tobacco. First, they argued that, while tobacco fell
literally under the definition of "drug," to find that it did so was large-
80 See Fuchs, supra note 24.
81 See generally Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act With Indiffe-
rence to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REv. 901 (2008).
82 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1380-81 (M.D.N.C
1997) (quoting from the Congressional Record).
83 Id. at 1396.
8 Id. at 1397.
85 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir.
1998).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 161 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14
(1976)) (internal citations omitted).
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ly contrary to the statute. In particular, if tobacco did fall under the
FDA's authority, their failure to ban it would amount to an abuse of
discretion.89 Second, the FDA had constantly stated that it did not
have the authority to regulate tobacco and that Congress's action in
the face of such statements was proof of acquiescence to the FDA. 90
Furthermore, and following on from this, Congress developed its own
regulatory regime for tobacco by passing a number of statutes from
1965 onwards, suggesting that Congress did not delegate tobacco reg-
ulation to the FDA.9' Moreover, the Fourth Circuit noted that any
decision "involving countervailing national policy concerns" should
be left to Congress. 9 2 Indeed, the majority took a hard-line RI ap-
proach - the FDA as a rational-instrumental body had little discretion
to take initiative on this issue.
This judgment, however, was accompanied by a strong dissent
from Circuit Judge Hall that reprised and strengthened the DC line of
analysis. Indeed, Hall's judgment is an exemplar of DC reasoning,
particularly in the way in which his reasoning encompasses the differ-
ent aspects of the FDA's power. The FDA, for him, was an institution
that was set up to address a series of problems. He stated "[t]he
FDCA delegates to the FDA the duty of promulgating and enforcing
regulations aimed at protecting the nation's citizens from misbranded
and unsafe drugs and food." 93 Moreover, Judge Hall noted the impor-
tance of understanding the FDCA in broad purposive terms. 9 4 This
was particularly important with regard to the FDA's change of posi-
tion on its authority to regulate tobacco. For Judge Hall, Congress did
not intend to delegate the power to regulate tobacco specifically. Ra-
ther, Judge Hall noted "[t]he operative congressional intent at the out-
set was simply to confer broad discretionary powers on the FDA to
regulate 'drugs' and 'devices.' The FDCA was written broadly
enough to accommodate both new products and evolving knowledge
about existing ones, and it was written that way on purpose.
From the DC perspective, explicit authorisation was not needed.
Likewise, Judge Hall described the FDA's change in stance growing
out of the rulemaking process and the administrative record, and as
8 See id. at 163-64.
89 Id. at 167.
90 See id. at 168-70.
' See id. at 171-75.
92Id. at 164.
" Id. at 176 (Hall J., dissenting).
94 See id. at 179.
95 Id.
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such, out of the active exercise of discretion of the FDA.96 The FDA
acted quite legitimately in changing its mind because of the analysis
and deliberation inherent in that rulemaking process. Judge Hall also
noted, that the majority's holding that tobacco could not fall under the
Act (because if it did it must be banned), confused the issue of how
the FDA regulated with whether it regulated.97 This collapsing of the
question of how an agency should regulate into the question of wheth-
er an agency can regulate is a common feature of the RI paradigm
because as very little discretion should be left to the administrator.
The decision was ultimately appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court
where a five to four majority upheld the Fourth Circuit's decision.98
The Supreme Court majority favoured an RI approach to the question
by emphasising the first step of the Chevron test and characterising it
as whether Congress had explicitly authorised the delegation. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated:
[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to
delegate a decision of such economic and political signific-
ance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion. To find that the
FDA has the authority to regulate tobacco products, one must
not only adopt an extremely strained understanding of "safe-
ty" as it is used throughout the Act - a concept central to the
FDCA's regulatory scheme - but also ignore the plain impli-
cation of Congress' subsequent tobacco-specific legislation.99
The Supreme Court majority, like the Fourth Circuit, understood the
FDCA's objective as ensuring that FDA regulated products were
"safe" and "effective" as particularly important.'00 The fact that
FDA's proposals to regulate tobacco would not result in safety would
thus obviate Congressional intent because Congress had granted no
remedial discretion under the Act.' 0 ' Likewise, the existence of to-
bacco specific legislation not only ratified the FDA's previous view
but also showed that Congress had developed a specific legislative
response to the issue.'02
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer took a very DC approach,
and his starting point was to note the constitutive nature of the FDCA:
96 See id.
" See id.
98 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
9 Id. at 160.
'" Id. at 133.
"o1 See id. at 134-36.
102 See id. at 156-57.
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After studying the FDCA's history, experts have written that
the statute "is a purposefully broad delegation of discretionary
powers by Congress," . . . and that, in a sense, the FDCA
"must be regarded as a constitution" that "establish[es] gener-
al principles" and "permit[s] implementation within broad pa-
rameters" so that the FDA can "implement these objectives
through the most effective and efficient controls that can be
devised."' 03
Indeed for Justice Breyer, the FDA should be largely understood as a
product of the New Deal and the FDCA was passed because such
bodies as the FDA "need[ed] broad authority and would exercise that
authority wisely."'1 A narrow reading of the statute would contra-
vene the statute's overall purpose of protecting health. 05 According-
ly, more tobacco-specific legislation did not override the authority of
the FDA. For Breyer, the FDA is an institution founded on DC prin-
ciples and should be held accountable as such.
At first glance, this line of cases may appear to some to have
nothing to do with the choice required between science and democra-
cy as described as in Part I. Yet as noted above, this line of cases has
usually been understood in purely ideological terms, and the outcome
of the case primarily being due to the unique place of the tobacco in-
dustry.106 Even those scholars who have focused on the application of
the Chevron doctrine have understood that doctrine as finding a bal-
ance between the democratic accountability' of the legislature and the
expertise of public administration.'0 7 What the analysis above reveals
is that the way in which the Chevron doctrine was applied in the
above cases was less about that choice between democracy and exper-
tise but far more about how the actual nature and power of the FDA
was characterised as an institution. That process of characterisation
was shaped not only by different judges' normative understandings
about what is, and should be, the nature of the administrative state, but
also by doctrine and institutional history. Indeed, the analysis above
begins to hint at the richness of administrative constitutionalism as a
form of legal culture.
103 Id. at 165 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
"' See id. at 165-66; see also BREYER, supra note 44.
'0 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 168 (2000).
1" Turley, supra note 59, at 437.
107 Sunstein, supra note 69, at 1058.
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B. The Southwood Working Party and the UK BSE Crisis
The role and significance of administrative constitutionalism can
also be seen in the context of the next case study. In contrast to the
case law discourse charted above, the UK BSE crisis has less of a
substantive legal dimension - a fact reflecting the nature of adminis-
trative law culture and administrative constitutionalism in the United
Kingdom. The non-legal nature of UK administrative constitutional-
ism is reflected in the fact that there was no significant challenge to
UK government decision-making in a UK court but there was a major
independent three year Inquiry.'os
The BSE crisis is a multi-faceted controversy,1 09 but one of its
most significant and controversial aspects was the UK government's
reliance on a short report published in 1989 by a committee, the
Southwood Working Party, on the issue of whether BSE presented a
human health risk.'io That report concluded "[flrom present evidence,
it is likely that cattle will prove to be a 'dead-end host' for the disease
agent and most unlikely that BSE will have any implications for hu-
man health. Nevertheless, if our assessments of these likelihoods are
incorrect, the implications would be extremely serious.""'
This conclusion was treated by government decision-makers as
authority for the proposition that BSE did not present a human health
risk despite: (1) the caveat; (2) the Working Party's small nature; (3)
the fact that the Working Party only met a few times; (4) the report's
brevity; and (5) the discussions regarding the report's uncertainties.
Not until 20 March 1996, did another expert committee, the Spongi-
form Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC), advise that the
"most likely explanation" for the appearance of a new and fatal dis-
ease in humans - variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (v-CJD) - was an
individual's exposure to BSE through direct beef consumption and the
use of beef products in other products such as cosmetics."12
The conventional explanation of this event is nearly always in
terms of the science/democracy dichotomy.' '1 The reliance on the
108 The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11.
'0 See generally id at vol. 1 (2000), http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/
archive/20060308232515/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volumel/toc.htm (last
accessed 18 March 2010).
110 WORKING PARTY REPORT ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY,
supra note 10.
. Id. at § 9.2.
112 Hansard, HC Deb, vol. 275, col. 375 (20 March 1996).
113 VAN ZWANENBERG & MILLSTONE, supra note 3; see also Merle Jacob &
Tomas Hellstrom, Policy Understanding of Science, Public Trust and the BSE-CJD
Crisis 78 J. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 303, 307-10 (2000).
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Southwood Working Party is either understood as due to the domin-
ance of political interests or as due to a naive faith in objectivity. 1 14
As this is the case, the solutions to the problems encountered in the
BSE crisis are thus understood to lie in greater transparency, objec-
tivity, and the promotion of communication between science and poli-
tics."
Viewing the creation, operation, and reception of the Southwood
Working Party through the lens of administrative constitutionalism
yields a very different narrative however. That narrative suggests that
the inappropriate reliance on the Working Party's report stemmed
from debates over the role and nature of legitimate public administra-
tion being carried on in the United Kingdom at that time. These
debates should be understood as debates over administrative constitu-
tionalism and the Southwood Working Party can be understood to
have operated itself on the basis of the DC paradigm but was created
and received in terms of the RI paradigm.
Broadly speaking, for much of the twentieth century, the DC pa-
radigm dominated the British administrative state. This dominance
can be seen in the institutional structure in the mid-1980s of the two
main administrative institutions involved in making decisions about
BSE - the Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries (MAFF) and
the Department of Health (DH).'l 6 Both departments were organised
along DC lines. Food safety was only one of a number of responsibil-
ities of these large sprawling departments, which had a three-prong
role of providing advice, formulating policy, and implementing that
policy." 7 Such departments were also responsible for an array of
different matters. MAFF, for example, was concerned both with the
protection of health and the promotion of interests of the agricultural
sector.' Though many have viewed this combination as leading to a
direct conflict of interest,1 9 from a DC perspective, the combination
was not problematic because of the deliberation's ability to diffuse the
power of self interest. 20
These departments were statutorily vested with administrative
powers, which were in very broad DC terms. Ministers and their
114 VAN ZWANENBERG & MILLSTONE, supra note 3, at 102.
"5 Id. at 229-78; see Gavin Little, BSE and the Regulation of Risk, 64 MOD.
L. REV. 730, 754-56 (2001); The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 1.
116 The BSE Inquiry, supra note I1, at vol. 15.
"' See id. at 5, 91 (2000).
118 Id.; VAN ZWANENBERG & MILLSTONE, supra note 3, at 50.
" VAN ZWANENBERG & MILLSTONE, supra note 3, at 50-54.
120 See Section III.B in Chapter One; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31-32 (1985).
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departments were entrusted with wide-ranging powers to deal with
complex problems as they arose. Most legislation granted significant
powers to pass secondary legislation to address issues with few proce-
dural constraints on how such legislation should be passed.121 Thus,
for example, under section 13(1) of the Food Act 1984:
The Ministers may make such regulations as appear to them
expedient for securing the observance of sanitary and cleanly
conditions and practices in connection with -
a) the sale of food for human consumption, or
b) the importation, preparation, transport, storage, pack-
aging, wrapping, exposure for sale, service or delivery of
food intended for sale or sold for human consumption,
or otherwise for the protection of the public health in connec-
tion with those matters.
Subsection 2 of the Act listed illustrative examples of the types of
regulations which might be passed under this provision but did not
limit the power of the Minister. The Act could also be amended by
Ministers acting in their executive capacity, via what is known as a
Henry VIII clause so long as there was a consultation process, albeit a
limited one.122
Furthermore, the DC paradigm permeated MAFF and DH through
the general culture of the permanent civil service and its guiding prin-
ciples of impartiality, integrity, and objectivity (in its non-scientific
sense).123 While the central government departments implemented
government policy, these departments were not simply the instru-
ments of the governing party. Personnel did not change with the
change of government, and civil servants understood their primary
duty as to serve the public interest, rather than a particular political
party's interest.12 4 The emphasis on generalist administrators reflect-
ed a recognition of the complexity of governing, and civil servants
were expected to be imaginative, responsive to change, and hu-
mane.125 Decisions and delegated legislation were understood to be
121 VAN ZWANENBERG & MILLSTONE, supra note 3, at 50-54.
122 Section 18 of the Food Act 1984.
123 For an interesting discussion of this, see DIANA WOODHOUSE, IN PURSUIT
OF Gooo ADMINISTRATION: MINISTERS, CIVIL SERVANTS AND JUDGES 27-39 (1997).
124 Id. at 32-34.
125 WILLIAM ARMSTRONG BARON, THE ROLE AND CHARACTER OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE 1 (1970).
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the product of a "long and tortuous process" in which the emphasis
was on deliberation and the putting across of a number of different
points of view.126 As one MAFF official put it, policy decisions re-
quired "a build-up of available information, discussion amongst offi-
cials either orally or through correspondence, perhaps preliminary
discussion with Ministers, [written] submissions to Ministers with
argument and options, discussion with Ministers, further discussion
between Ministers, decisions and an action timetable."' 2 7 The aim
was for a frank and wide-ranging consideration of issues with input
from numerous different sources, albeit that conversation only in-
volved a small group.128
By the late 1970s, however, the dominance of the DC paradigm
was being challenged. In particular, the deliberative capacities and
the public interest of the permanent civil service were starting to be
doubted. Decisions were now being understood by commentators
and political actors as less a product of wise judgment and more
as a product of "fudge and smudge, a quagmire of intellectual fuzzi-
ness . . . and administrative laxity."l 2 9 Moreover, there was an in-
creasing perception, particularly among Members of Parliament, that
the civil service should serve the ruling government, and the 1980s'
Conservative government introduced administrative, management and
financial reforms, including regulatory impact analysis (as part of the
Deregulation Initiative), to encourage this shift to RI thinking.130
Thus, by the late 1980s, a more RI understanding of the role of the
civil service was becoming apparent, and civil servants began to see
that their giving of advice was less in line with the tradition of the
permanent civil service and more the provision of information the
Minister wanted to hear.'3' The civil service was transforming from a
permanent DC institution to a RI agent of the ruling party.
This set of changes can be seen particularly in relation to the role
and nature of expertise and information. As noted in Part One, exper-
126 See The BSE Inquiry, supra note I1, at vol. 15.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 10; see also id at vol. 3.
129 Andrew Jordan, The Impact on UK Environmental Administration, in I
BRITISH ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND EUROPE 183 (Philip Lowe & Stephen Ward
eds., 1998); see also Barbara Castle, Mandarin Power, in THE WHITEHALL READER 61
(Peter Barberis ed., 1996); WOODHOUSE, supra note 123, at 37-38. FULTON
COMMITTEE, THE CIVIL SERVICE - VOLUME ONE (Cmnd 3638, 1968).
130 Cabinet Office, The Armstrong Memorandum, in THE WHITEHALL READER
114 (Peter Barberis ed., 1996); The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 15, at 62-67,
136.
'13 Id. at 10.
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tise is understood to have a role under both the DC and RI paradigms,
but that role is understood in different ways.
From a DC perspective, the role and nature of expertise in public
administration was understood as one input into decision-making ra-
ther than its source of authority. 132 Both the MAFF and DH found it
important to have both generalist and specialist administrators work-
ing together in a "cooperative" problem solving process in which the
role of each would depend on the nature of the problem. 133 Heads of
the specialist branches also saw themselves in DC terms.' 3 4 Scientific
advice to these government departments was largely provided by ad
hoc expert committees set up to consider specific issues.'35 That ex-
pertise was defined in broad, deliberative terms, and the expertise of
the official scientific advisor lay not in a "monopoly of scientific wis-
dom" but rather "in a practical experience of the way the machine of
government works."' 36
Expertise was thus broad-based and not simply confined to the
methodologies of a discipline. Experts participated in policy-making,
which was understood to be a multidisciplinary exercise.' 37 Moreo-
ver, during the early years of the BSE crisis, quantitative methodolo-
gies were not seen as necessary in the risk evaluation process.138
While such methods were seen as relevant to areas where knowledge
allowed their use, such tools were limited in areas where considerable
scientific uncertainties existed.13 9 The concepts of reasonableness and
proportionality were preferred as broad guiding principles, as was
general precautionary thinking. 140 Likewise the concept of "best prac-
ticable means," developed in the nineteenth century, continued to be
the basis for action and also gave rise to associated qualitative con-
cepts such as "as low as reasonably practicable"(ALARP).14' Histori-
cally, the application of these concepts did not require the precise
quantification of risk but rather required the application of as safe
standards as feasibly possible. This was understood primarily as a
matter of practical judgment and one in which mathematical concepts
132 Id. at 23.
133 Id. at 30, 32; DEREK H. ANDREWS, STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE TO THE BSE
INQUIRY, No. 281 19 (Nov. 10, 1998).
134 The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 15.
13s Id. at 23-40.
136 SOLLY ZUCKERMAN, ADVICE AND RESPONSIBILITY: ROMANES LECTURE FOR
1975 33 (1975).
'37 The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 15, at 33-34.
13 Id. at 45.
"3 Id. at 46, 50-51.
140 Id. at 46, 48.
141 Id. at 42.
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of risks did not significantly figure. 142 These ideas flowed from an
understanding that technological risk problems were complex and thus
would not yield easily to strict methodological approaches.143
Simultaneously, the role and nature of expertise changed from be-
ing understood in DC terms to being grounded in a RI understanding
of public administration. Not only was the role of scientific advice
being understood more in terms of a customer-contractor relationship
but also in government policy and administrative arrangements an
increasing emphasis was placed on the use of risk assessment metho-
dologies and on ensuring that decisions were based on analytical evi-
dence.'" These changes only began at the time that the Southwood
Working Party operated, and hence the Working Party was operating
in a context in which both DC and RI conceptions of expertise were at
work.
The first case of BSE was identified by the MAFF-run Central
Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) in 1986, but MAFF Ministers were in-
formed about BSE in June 1987.145 The discourse among the senior
civil servants after this memorandum was a DC nature. First, these
civil servants focused upon the possibility that health risks might have
arisen from BSE.14 6 This small group deliberated about the nature of
the uncertainties involved and how one would go about establishing
whether there was a health risk.147 They planned a programme of
research 4 8 but also saw their role as taking precautionary action, even
if such a risk could not be strictly proved.14 9 An options paper' was
circulated among MAFF officials in early 1988, which reflected wide-
ranging deliberations." 0 Very little in that paper focused on issues of
evidence, even though BSE remained a poorly understood disease. In
February 1988, senior officials proposed to the MAFF Minister, John
MacGregor, the action to be taken in relation to BSE. In that submis-
142 HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, REDUCING RISKS, PROTECTING PEOPLE
(1999).
143 Id.; Elizabeth Fisher, Drowning by Numbers: Standard Setting in Risk
Regulation and the Pursuit of Accountable Public Administration, 20 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 109 (2000).
'4 The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 2; id at vol. 5, at 49.
145 Id. at vol. 5, at 10.
146 Id. at 124.
147 Id. at 121, 123, 125-27.
148 Id. at 26, 121.
149 ANDREWS, supra note 133, at 34; The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol.
5, at 121, 124; see Lawrence, BSE: Meeting 9AM on 8 Jan in CVO: Room, BSE
INQUIRY EVIDENCE, Y.B. 1988, 88\01.04\2.1-2.4 (1988), available at http://www
.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20060308232515/http://www.bseinquiry.gov
.uk/evidence/yb/index.htm.
1so The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 5, at 125.
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sion, senior officials recognised the considerable scientific uncertain-
ties involved, others related concerns such as welfare and trade, and
MAFF's responsibility in relation to human health.'"' Before that
submission was given to the Minister, it was circulated among MAFF
officials with a cover note, stating:
We do not know where this disease came from, we do not
know how it is spread and we do not know whether it can be
passed to humans. The last point seems to me to be the most
worrying aspect of the problem. There is no evidence that
people can be infected but we cannot say that there is no
risk.152
Even though this was the case, the submission recommended precau-
tionary action through a slaughter and compensation scheme.15 3 This
scheme was controversial however, because it conflicted with the pol-
icy then in operation to recover costs from industry. 5 4 Moreover, if
compensation was to be paid, MAFF would need to show that such
expenditure would yield benefits - a difficult thing to do in circums-
tances of scientific uncertainty, but logical in a context in which the
Treasury was attempting to control the administrative state.155
The submission was put to the relevant Minister, John
MacGregor, with accompanying advice from the Permanent Secretary
which stated:
I do not see how you could defend taking no action now un-
less you had the support of the Chief Medical Officer [CMO].
But, on the face of it, it seems unlikely that he would feel able
to endorse a wholly reassuring statement of the likely risks of
transmission of this disease to man until we have much more
information available. 56
However, MacGregor made clear that action would not be taken
without seeking the advice of the CMO.157 This stance was due to
MacGregor's understanding of reasonable administrative action in RI
terms and that any decision should be based on firm evidence."'
' Id. at 127.
152 Id. at 126-27.
" Id. at 128.
154 Id. at 128-29; RICHARD PACKER, THE POLITICS OF BSE 37-38 (2006).
ss The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 5, at 128.
1s6 Id. at 129.
117 PACKER, supra note 154, at 37.
158 John MacGregor, Statement of Evidence to the BSE Inquiry, No. 302 116,
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MacGregor's reasons for taking this stance were that it was consistent
with the RI paradigm, which was being promoted by the Treasury's
budgetary policies, by the Deregulation Initiative, and by the percep-
tion that evidence was needed to withstand any judicial review chal-
lenges.'59 Moreover, MacGregor saw a direct analogy between BSE
and rhizomania in sugar beet160 and was concerned that compensation
for the former would require compensation to the latter. 161 This sim-
plistic understanding of both problems ignored the serious health im-
plications of BSE.162
The CMO, on being informed, recognised the problems of assess-
ing the potential health risks, the need to investigate the issue further,
and the need to seriously consider regulatory action. He recommend-
ed setting up an expert committee to advise on the matter.'6 In evi-
dence to the BSE Inquiry, the CMO explained that there were a num-
ber of reasons for this recommendation. These included: the scientific
uncertainty that existed concerning the health risks, the inappropriate-
ness of the CMO giving such advice "off the cuff," and the need for
expert advice to justify a slaughter and compensation scheme to the
Treasury. ' In other words, a committee was needed for both DC and
RI reasons. 16 5 The Committee that was set up was the Southwood
Working Party.
The group first met on 20 June 1988, and it produced its final re-
port in February 1989. Before the first meeting, MAFF had banned
the use of ruminants in ruminant feed and made BSE a notifiable dis-
ease that was to be reported to the CVL.166 Immediately following its
first meeting, the Working Party made interim recommendations.
Specifically, the Working Party suggested a compulsory slaughter
and compensation scheme for infected animals be introduced and that
a research committee be set up to investigate the animal and human
19 (Dec. 2, 1998), available at http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/
archive/20060308232515/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/evidence/ws/wsalpha4.htm;
VAN ZWANENBERG & MILLSTONE, supra note 3, at 88.
159 See The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 6, at 115; see also id. at vol. 5,
at 130.
'6 Id. at vol. 5, at 154-55.
161 Id. at 130.
162 See id. at 154.
161 Id. at 133.
'64 Id. at 150, 161.
165 See Lord Phillips questioning of Sir Derek Andrews in relation to issue of
whether different reasons for setting up expert committees may exist. The BSE In-
quiry, Transcript of Oral Hearing Day 81 (Nov. 10, 1998), at 10:18 - 12:23, available
at http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20060308232515/http://www.bse
inquiry.gov.uk/evidence/trans/transcripts.htm.
' Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Order, 1988, S.I. 1988/1039 (U.K.).
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health risks of BSE. The government accepted both these recommen-
dations in its final report, the Working Party recommended that the
regulatory authorities address the possible health risks from medicines
and occupational exposure and ban the use of thymus and offal in
baby food.16 7 As shall be illustrated below, the thymus and offal ban
in baby food made no obvious sense.
My concern is not with what the Working Party recommended
however, but with what was understood to be its role and nature in the
risk evaluation process. As can be seen above, the Working Party
operated in a context in which both the DC and RI paradigms were at
play, and thus, what was understood as the role and nature of such an
expert body was bifurcated. The Working Party was created mainly
because of a perception among senior civil servants that regulatory
action could not be taken without evidence and/or expert advice. This
RI understanding of reasonable administrative action diverged from
traditional DC ideas, but the actual establishment and operation of the
Working Party was along DC lines. This can be seen in what was
understood to be the expertise of the Working Party, how it operated,
and what it perceived as its role in risk evaluation.
In regards to the first issue, the Working Party's expertise was in-
itially understood by those on it in very broad terms. As the academic
Jasanoff has put it, the committee was staffed by the "great and the
good," whose authority derived not from individuals' specific
disciplinary expertise but from their ability to exercise "caution, empi-
ricism, and constraint."' 68 The Working Party consisted of four emi-
nent research scientists who lacked particular expertise in transmissi-
ble spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) but rather had more general
expertise in the area.'69 This was seen as desirable by those appoint-
ing the members of the Working Party because it was felt that those
who had direct expertise in TSEs would be "too close to the front line
to take the slightly broader view needed."170 In asking Sir Richard
Southwood to chair the Party, the CMO told Southwood that he was
the appropriate choice because "it is an ecological food chain problem
[Southwood's area of expertise] and because I know you are an inde-
pendent chap."l71 In oral evidence to the BSE Inquiry,
167 WORKING PARTY REPORT ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY,
supra note 10, at § § 5.3.5, 8.2, 8.3.
168 Sheila Jasanoff, Civilization and Madness: The Great BSE Scare of 1996,
6 PUB. UNDERSTANDING Sci. 221, 227-28 (1997).
169 The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 4, at 2-3.
170 Id. at 3.
171 Statement of Sir Richard Southwood to the BSE Inquiry, available at
http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20060308232515/http://www.bse
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Southwood said he did not see the Working Party as "experts in the
narrow sense of carrying out research into BSE," and it was for this
reason that the committee was called a Working Party.17 2 This is not
to say that the Working Party ignored those with expertise in TSEs,
but rather only consulted them, particularly those who had long expe-
rience in the area.173 The breadth of the Working Party's expertise
extended beyond the scientific and most of those on the Working Par-
ty had experience on other government committees and thus unders-
tood their task in broad public interest terms.174 In particular, these
experienced members saw that their deliberations, while taking ac-
count of the policy context, should not be influenced by specific inter-
ests.'75 These views were consistent with the DC ideals of the civil
service and with an appreciation that technological risks are not easily
manageable.
The second way in which the expertise of the Working Party
accorded with the DC paradigm is in the deliberative way that the
Working Party conducted itself. The Committee saw itself as a "scop-
ing committee" that needed to see what "pointers they could discover"
about BSE.176 As this was the case, the fact that the Members of the
Working Party did not have a grasp on all issues was not necessarily
problematic. Moreover, the members viewed themselves as the first,
not the last, word on the problem and that their role was to identify
what the issues were through a wide scoping analysis. Because of
their need to "scope" the committee felt that very broad terms of ref-
erence were important because "one could not have been restricted
and operated properly."' 77 The Working Party needed an expansive
perspective on BSE and all the problems it might create. Indeed, the
Working Party's inquiries and deliberations covered a range of issues
including: the nature of the disease itself; problems inherent in
ruminant feed; health risks to animals; and human health risks arising
from medicines, food, and occupational exposure. 178 As a result, the
inquiry.gov.uk/evidence/ws/index.htm.
172 The BSE Inquiry, Transcript of Oral Hearing Day 3 (Mar. 11, 1998),
at 6:4-15, available at http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20060308
232515/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/evidence/trans/transcripts.htm.
173 The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 4, at 3-4.
174 See Statement of Sir Richard Southwood, supra note 171; THE BSE
INQUIRY, supra note 169, at 3-4.
17 See Statement of Sir Richard Southwood, supra note 171.
176 The BSE Inquiry, Transcript of Oral Hearing Day 3, at 12 (Mar. 11, 1998),
available at http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20060308232515/http://
www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/evidence/trans/transcripts.htm.
17 Id. at 14:4-5; see also The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 4, at 2.
178 The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 4, at 8-11.
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Working Party members were acutely aware that they were operating
in the context of many scientific and behavioural uncertainties." 9
Thus, for example, Southwood, in discussing these issues with
MacGregor, the MAFF Minister, stressed that the Working Party was
operating in "uncharted waters." 8 0  The Working Party consulted
formally and informally with an array of people, albeit within a rea-
sonably small circle.' 8 ' Deliberations were supported by advice and
information resources from DH and MAFF.182 The Working Party did
not carry out quantitative risk assessments but operated on the
ALARP principle, although not in a systematic way. 83 Instead, they
deliberated on the scientific issues in light of general principles of
proportionality and reasonableness.
The third way that those of the Working Party saw themselves in
DC terms is that they saw their report not as an authoritative basis for
action but as one input into the deliberative process. Indeed, the bulk
of the report was less than twenty pages long (thirty-five pages with
appendices), and while a good overview of the state of knowledge
about BSE at that time, it contained little in-depth analysis of data.
Most of its analysis was in qualitative terms, and the report was not
heavily footnoted. Moreover, as already noted in the introduction, the
conclusions in the report contained an important caveat regarding
uncertainties about the effects on human health.184 Throughout the
report, the authors stressed the problems of scientific uncertainty, 85
problems created by the long incubation of the disease,' 86 and the
need to do more research.'87  The scientific and evidentiary issues
were discussed in terms of theories, assumptions and hypotheses.1
The report reads as a preliminary judgment on the available informa-
tion rather than as an exercise in proving risks. Indeed, in evidence to
the Inquiry, those on the Working Party stressed that their conclusions
were based on judgment and that "good and wise men and women
179 Id. at 20; see also The BSE Inquiry, Transcript of Oral Hearing Day 3, at
13 (Mar. 11, 1998), available at http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/
20060308232515/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/evidence/trans/transcripts.htm.
1so The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 4, at 20.
"'Id. at 1 1, 17.
182 Id. at 6-7.
181Id. at 48-49.
184 WORKING PARTY REPORT ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY,
supra note 10, at § 9.2.
as §§ 1.1, 3.1, 3.4, 4.2.5, 5.3.1, 5.3.6.
186 3.4.
1 § 5.2.3.
1 §§ 2.6,4.1.3-4.1.4, 4.2.5, 4.2.9, 5.2.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.6.
84 HEAL TH MIA TRIX [Vol. 20:55
may reach different sorts of conclusions." 89 Moreover, the members
hoped that due to the progress in research that their report would soon
be out of date.' 90 That was because those on the Working Party did
not see themselves as research scientists but rather as providing an
account of the issues at a particular point in time. As Sir Anthony
Epstein, one of the members of the Working Party stated:
[W]e were simply asked to alert them to the implications, and
that is what we did. They had their army of civil servants and
Government scientists. It was for them to take over at that
stage, and decide what policy should be followed by govern-
ment. It was not the remit of the Working Party to enter into
that at all.19'
Moreover, some of the Working Parties' conclusions regarding BSE
coincided with what MAFF officials had already concluded. In fact,
in the words of the BSE Inquiry, these conclusions would have been
"shared by any scientists, or indeed intelligent layman" informed of
the issues. 92
The problem however, was that the Southwood Working Party's
report was not treated as one input into an ongoing process of risk
evaluation. Rather, it was treated by those in MAFF and DH as if it
"contained definitive conclusions based on an evaluation of adequate
data by expert scientists in relation to the extent both of the risk and of
the precautionary measures necessary to counter that risk."'93
This interpretation of the report, while entirely at odds with a DC
understanding of the role and nature of expertise, was very consistent
with the concept of expertise embodied in the RI paradigm of admin-
istrative constitutionalism. Because public administration should only
act when rigorous analysis has established a factual basis, the Work-
ing Party's report was interpreted as such to meet that end.
First, the Report was interpreted as an authoritative risk evalua-
tion, concluding that the human health risks from BSE were remote.
Until the Working Party's statement on 20 March 1996, the UK gov-
ernment consistently stated that beef was safe to eat and preventative
measures reflected this belief. Such BSE statements repeatedly fo-
cused on the scientific evidence. The Inquiry was replete with phrases
such as "[t]here is no scientific justification to avoid eating British
189 The BSE Inquiry, supra note I1, at vol. 4, at 67.
190 Id. at 67.
'91 Id. at 69.
192 Id. at 42.
'9' Id at 1.
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beef'l9 4 and "there is no scientific evidence of a casual link between
BSE in cattle and CJD in humans"'9 were common phrases.'96 Em-
phasis was placed on measures being "based on the best scientific
expertise available" 9 7 and on the most "eminent and distinguished
scientists"l 9 8 having found no such risk. The assumption was that the
Working Party's conclusions could not be revisited unless new evi-
dence or an improved risk evaluation appeared.'99 As such, govern-
ment expert committees also relied heavily on the Report until the
evidence warranted a new risk evaluation. 20 0
Second, the government treated the advice of the Working Party
as the primary basis for carrying out administrative and regulatory
action. As one MAFF Minister noted, it was a "bible" 20' and others
saw it as "the foundation of government policy." 2 02 As a practical
consequence of this view, all regulatory action needed to be justified
by officials in terms of the Working Party's report, and any action that
went beyond that advice needed to be strictly justified.203 The main
regulatory initiatives that the UK government took in relation to hu-
man health - the slaughter and compensation policy and the specified
offal ban - were both a direct product of the advice of the Working
Party as were other more minor regulatory actions.204
Moreover, administrators, even specialist administrators, did not
see it as their task to question the report. In a statement to the
BSE Inquiry, the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) at the time of the
Southwood Report stated that:
[T]the Southwood Working Party had considered the then
available scientific evidence (from work on scrapie), had con-
ducted a risk assessment and had concluded that any risk of
transmission of BSE to humans was remote. I had no reason
to question that conclusion and nor did I have responsibility
194 The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11.
195 Id. at 531.
196 Id. at 348, 365, 368, 372-73.
197 Id. at 369.
19' Id. at 377.
'" E.g., id. at 120-21, 136, 143.
200 PACKER, supra note 154, at 46.
201 The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 4, at 67.
202 Id. at vol. 11, at 1.
203 Id. at 1-2.
204 For example, the ban on milk from cattle suspected of being infected with
BSE. WORKING PARTY REPORT ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY, supra
note 10, at § 10.4; The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (No. 2) Order, 1988, S.I.
1988/2299, art. 9 (U.K.).
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to do so. Similarly, I believe that my colleagues and Minis-
ters did not question the conclusion that the risk was remote2 0 5
The CVO saw his task as acting on the basis of evidence. The CVO
understood his responsibility as a conduit for information and exper-
tise rather than as a deliberating official. Moreover, the CVO unders-
tood the role and nature of the Working Party, in rationalistic terms, as
providing the relevant methodological analysis of evidence. Thus, the
CVO described the Working Party as carrying out a "risk assess-
ment," even though the Working Party never used that language itself
or purported to carry out any formal risk assessment.
This stance on the role of expertise is very different from that seen
under the DC paradigm where expert input was understood as the
starting point for deliberation rather than the closure of it. Neither the
MAFF nor DH made significant attempts to formally review the
Working Party's report, even though it was obvious among MAFF
and DH officials that the report's advice was problematic.206 For ex-
ample, it became increasingly clear that the Working Party had not
taken into account slaughterhouse practices, an issue which was im-
portant in thinking about how any regulations were to apply. 20 7
More significantly, however, one of the report's recommendations
was quickly found to be not well thought out. In the body of the re-
port, the Working Party recommended that manufacturers refrain from
using ruminant offal and thymus in baby food.208 This recommenda-
tion was based on the assumption that these parts of cattle may be
infective in subclinical animals, and if so, babies would be particularly
vulnerable in being exposed to BSE.209
There were a number of problems with this recommendation.
First, thymus was not used in baby food, and ruminant offal's mean-
ing was open to different interpretations.210 It quickly became appar-
ent to officials that the recommendation had not been based on a tho-
rough analysis of the issue. MAFF and DH responded to this problem
by asking Sir Richard Southwood for clarification rather than using
the recommendation as a starting point for deliberation.21 1 Second, a
number of officials saw a disjunction between the suggested action to
205 The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 5, at 145 (emphasis added).
206 Id. at 99, 103.
207 PACKER, supra note 154, at 42.
208 WORKING PARTY REPORT ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY,
supra note 10, at § 5.3.5.
209 The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 4, at 50.
210 Id. at vol. 5, at 84, 91.
211 Id. at 91.
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be taken to protect babies and the lack of similar action in relation to
children and adults. While babies were clearly more susceptible to
TSEs, it did not follow that a risk to babies precluded a risk to
adults.2 12 Third, the Working Party had recommended a slaughter and
owner compensation policy for those animals obviously suffering
from BSE, a policy based on the assumption that such animals should
not be consumed by humans. However, considering the long incuba-
tion period of the disease and the fact that it could be infective in
subclinical animals, the lack of precautions in relation to cattle not
diagnosed with BSE but which might be infected with it seemed
odd.211 MAFF and DH officials deliberated and discussed these is-
sues. While many in MAFF and DH were experts on disease notifica-
tion, the Working Party's expert advice was still viewed as the only
legitimate basis for discussing the possibilities of regulatory action.2 14
Ultimately, the recommendation regarding baby food transformed
into a wider ban on certain specified offal being using in products
consumed by humans.21 5 Such a ban turned out to be eminently sens-
ible and entirely consistent with the application of the traditional DC
principle of ALARP.216 The ban, however, was not justified in DC
terms. Rather, the ban was seen by most in MAFF and DH as an ap-
plication of the Working Party's expert advice, the ban's wider nature
being explained as due to the technicalities of the legal system, which
meant it was the only way to implement that advice.2 17 Deliberations
that had occurred in MAFF and DH were not seen as the legitimate
basis for administrative action, and many did not believe the ban was
necessary because there was no basis in the scientific advice for it.2 18
111. IMPLICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM FOR THINKING ABOUT FOOD
SAFETY CRISES
The two case studies above are remarkably different. The inter-
pretation of the FDCA by three courts is an exercise in legally con-
strained doctrinal analysis, the sort with which U.S. lawyers will be
well acquainted. The role of the Southwood Working Party will strike
U.S. lawyers as peculiarly strange. There was no legislated rulemak-
212 Id. at 105, 118-19.
213 See id at 103.
214 id.
215 Bovine Offal (Prohibition) Regulations, 1989, S.I. 1989/2061 (U.K.).
216 See The BSE Inquiry, supra note 11, at vol. 6, at 84, 91.
217 Id. at 85, 198-99.
218 Id. at vol. 1, at 45.
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mg process for either MAFF or DH, no need for the compilation of a
record, and no judicial review (although the threat of it existed). Both
case studies highlight that food safety crises do not operate in a
vacuum and do not simply require striking the right balance between
science and democracy, or objectivity and values. Rather both con-
troversies focus on the legitimacy of public administration and what is
understood as good administrative decision-making. Thus, the per-
ceived scope of the FDCA largely turned on what judges understood
to be the role and nature of the FDA. Likewise, what significance and
interpretation was given to the Southwood Working Party's report by
officials depended on what was understood to be the larger role for
public administration and expertise. Moreover, the two cases high-
light that the issue of legitimacy of public administration has many
different dimensions.
Three major implications of analysing food safety crises in terms
of administrative constitutionalism arise. The first is that public ad-
ministration and administrative constitutionalism becomes the central
focus of these crises. Recognising this does not require a dramatic
rewriting of the whole field, but rather, it provides a more accurate
starting point for understanding these debates. Assumptions about
what is good public administration drive the administrative and
judicial responses to issues. Thus, in the tobacco case, competing
conceptions of the role and nature of the FDA transcended simplistic
pro- and anti-regulatory ideology. Likewise, the reliance on the
Southwood Working Party's report had more to do with a naive pur-
suit of good public administration than a product of scheming political
interest. Indeed, what can be seen from these two brief examples is
that a focus on public administration and administrative constitutio-
nalism results in a more nuanced account of food safety crises in
which different institutions, doctrines, frameworks, policies, and
ideals are all seen to have a role to play. That nuance highlights that
reform should often be more subtle and sophisticated than it currently
is. Thus for example, reform should not be about more science or
more participation but rather about developing particular types of
science and participation for the issue at hand.219
The second implication of the studies above is that there are no
utopian solutions to food safety crises. Put another way, food safety
crises are inevitable because no perfect paradigm of administrative
constitutionalism exists in the food safety context. Food safety issues
are simply too uncertain, complex, and socio-politically ambiguous,
219 ORTWIN RENN, RISK GOVERNANCE: COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN A
COMPLEX WORLD (2008).
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and both the RI and DC paradigms have their strengths and their
weaknesses. The DC paradigm emphasises the need for public ad-
ministration to wield considerable discretion so as to aid their ability
to solve problems effectively, but the granting of considerable discre-
tion to public administration makes it more difficult to hold DC public
administration to account. This dilemma is particularly evident in the
UK context where historically public administration has acted within
few constraints. The RI paradigm promises accountability and control
but does so at the cost of effective problem solving. Thus in the to-
bacco case, the FDA was powerless in the face of a significant public
health issue. Appreciating the intractability of food safety problems
may be depressing for some, but such an appreciation is important. In
particular, it helps direct reform by avoiding a fruitless search for the
perfect model of food safety regulation. Rather, by those involved in
reform appreciating intractability, a far more pragmatic debate about
how to find a negotiated compromise between different paradigms of
administrative constitutionalism can be developed.
The third implication of these two studies is to highlight the par-
ticular importance of legal culture. Legal culture is not just an in-
strument. In the tobacco cases, the dispute was not only a legal one
but was occurring in a legal arena in legal terms using legal authori-
ties. Likewise, the Southwood Working Party was embedded deeply
within UK administrative constitutionalism with all its ideals, poli-
cies, institutions, and structures. A study of food safety crises thus
needs to be a study of everything from basic facts about a legal system
to "more nebulous aspects of ideas, values, aspirations and mentali-
ties."220 Legal culture is not a static ideal but constantly evolving due
to changes in arguments and ideas. Moreover, legal culture is not
simply an instrument of other disciplines - it is a "thick" cultural phe-
nomenon that is both complex and substantive in nature.221 The
"thickness" of legal culture is in part due to it operating at the point of
contact between "sociological description and normative assess-
ment." 222
Highlighting the importance of legal culture is particularly impor-
tant in an era in which issues of food safety have become closely
intertwined with issues of globalisation.223 In particular, food safety
standards have become the focus of World Trade Organisation (WTO)
220 David Nelken, Using the Concept of Legal Culture, 29 AUSTL. J. LEGAL
PHIL. 1, 1 (2004).
221 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 214 (1993).
222 Webber, supra note 56, at 36.
223 CATHERINE BUTrON, THE POWER TO PROTECT: TRADE, HEALTH AND
UNCERTAINTY IN THE WTO (2004).
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settlement proceedings, and these disputes have been understood pri-
marily in terms of the science/democracy dichotomy.22 4 Disputes
between two jurisdictions are thus usually understood as disputes over
whether science or values should be the basis of food safety decision-
making. 22 5 Yet if food safety is shaped and framed by administrative
constitutionalism then this analysis is no longer valid. Not only can
disputes between jurisdictions not be oversimplified this way, but
such disputes must themselves be understood as forums for debating
and sharing discourses of administrative constitutionalism. 226 This
process of sharing and debating is not a straightforward one, and
highlighting it underscores some difficult legal questions about globa-
lisation227
CONCLUSION
The theme of this Symposium is rethinking food safety crises.
The rethinking that has been argued for in this article has been dra-
matic - the need to view food safety regulation and controversies
through a very different lens - that of administrative constitutional-
ism. The nature of that rethinking was illustrated with two case stu-
dies both of which highlight the multidimensional and culturally
bound notion of administrative constitutionalism.
The implications of this rethinking are also significant. Crises can
no longer be explained in glib one-liners. Reform needs to be unders-
tood in more subtle terms, and is unlikely to lead to a perfect solution.
All of that is sobering for the scholar and decision maker, as it is ob-
vious that far more attention must be paid to legal culture and legal
detail. Moreover, this rethinking highlights the fact there are unlikely
to be any perfect solutions to the problems of food safety and that
globalisation brings with it some difficult challenges.
224 Elizabeth Fisher, Beyond the Science/Democracy Dichotomy: The World
Trade Organisation Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and Administrative Con-
stitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL
REGULATION 327, 349 (Christian Joerges & Emst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006); see
FISHER, supra note 8, at 173-206.
225 Howard Chang, Risk Regulation, Endogenous Public Concerns, and the
Hormones Dispute: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself?, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 744, 745-46
(2004); Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-
Science Organization": Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the
Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251, 252 (1998); Jonathan B.
Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States and
Europe, 5 J. RISK RES. 317, 320 (2002).
226 See FISHER, supra note 8, at 173-206.
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